Renzi removed : the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum and its outcome by Bull, MJ
Re nzi r e m ove d  : t h e  2 0 1 6  It alian  
cons ti t u tion al r efe r e n d u m  a n d  its  
ou tco m e
Bull, MJ
Tit l e Re nzi r e m ove d  : t h e  2 0 1 6  It alian  cons ti t u tion al 
r efe r e n d u m  a n d  it s  ou tco m e
Aut h or s Bull, MJ
Typ e Book S e c tion
U RL This  ve r sion  is available  a t :  
h t t p://usir.s alfor d. ac.uk/id/e p rin t/46 7 7 9/
P u bl i s h e d  D a t e 2 0 1 7
U SIR is a  digi t al collec tion  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  ou t p u t  of t h e  U nive r si ty of S alford.  
Whe r e  copyrigh t  p e r mi t s,  full t ex t  m a t e ri al  h eld  in t h e  r e posi to ry is m a d e  
fre ely availabl e  online  a n d  c a n  b e  r e a d ,  dow nloa d e d  a n d  copied  for  no n-
co m m e rcial p riva t e  s t u dy o r  r e s e a r c h  p u r pos e s .  Ple a s e  c h e ck  t h e  m a n u sc rip t  
for  a ny fu r t h e r  copyrig h t  r e s t ric tions.
For  m o r e  info r m a tion,  including  ou r  policy a n d  s u b mission  p roc e d u r e ,  ple a s e
con t ac t  t h e  Re posi to ry Tea m  a t :  u si r@s alford. ac.uk .
Renzi Removed: the 2016 Italian Constitutional Referendum and its Outcome 
Martin J. Bull 
 
On 4 December 2016, Italians voted in a referendum on what was the most significant 
constitutional reform proposal since the one adopted by the Berlusconi government and 
rejected in a constitutional referendum in 2006 (Bull 2007). The reform was proposed by 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi with the aim of overcoming the long-term deficiencies of 
Italian institutional arrangements and the failure of successive governments, over a period of 
forty years, to carry through institutional reform (Crainz and Fusaro 2016; Bull, 2015). This 
was only the third constitutional referendum in the history of the Italian Republic (following 
those held in 2001 and 2006). Like Berlusconi’s proposals, those of Renzi were extensive 
(promising to rewrite nearly a third of the Constitution) and controversial, both in substance 
and in the way in which they had been passed through parliament. In addition, Renzi’s 
proposals split the leadership of the Democratic Party (PD) as well as bringing forward 
judgement day on his government - a consequence of Renzi stating, in the Prime Minister’s 
traditional end-of-year press conference in December 2015, that, ‘if I lose the referendum, I 
will consider my political experience to have failed.’ Even if he later tried to back-pedal from 
this position, it was clear that the future of the Renzi government depended on the 
referendum outcome, raising considerably its broader political significance. This was 
confirmed when, days after a decisive No vote in the referendum, Renzi resigned.  
This chapter, having first explained the origins of this constitutional referendum (for   
detailed of the constitutional reform proposal see Fusaro 2017), then analyses the broader 
politics behind it, the referendum campaign, the result and, finally, the immediate impact on 
Italian politics and the potential implications for Italian institutional reform in the future. 
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The Origins of the Constitutional Referendum of 2016 
The 2016 referendum was on the Constitutional reform proposal known as the Renzi-Boschi 
reform after its two main protagonists, the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and the Minister for 
Reform, Maria Elena Boschi. It had been presented to parliament by the Renzi government 
on 8 April 2014 and been given final approval by that body, after some modifications, two 
years later, on 12 April 2016. The legislation’s long and controversial journey through 
parliament led to significant revisions, although the final outcome was largely in keeping 
with the broad contours of Renzi’s original bill. In brief, the constitutional reform involved 
the following major changes: a radical change to the nature of the Senate, through a 
curtailment of its powers and a drastic reduction in the number of Senators (from 315 to 100) 
who would be elected only indirectly; the location of the confidence vote and the power to 
decide on most legislation in the lower house (the Chamber of Deputies), with the Senate 
having equal powers only in relation to certain legislative areas (e.g. constitutional reform, 
ratification of treaties, election of the President), thus ending Italy’s unusual system of 
‘symmetrical bicameralism’ (where both Chambers had equal powers); a re-shaping of the 
competences between centre and locality, with all legislative authority being located in one or 
the other, thus ending the existing system of shared competences, and generally increasing 
the degree of centralized control; and the abolition of the provinces and of the National 
Council for Economics and Labour (CNEL). In total, the reform would have modified 47 of 
the Constitution’s 139 articles.  
Under Article 138 of the Constitution, laws amending the Constitution must be 
adopted by each Chamber after two successive debates with intervals of not less than three 
months and approved by an absolute majority of the members of each Chamber on the second 
vote. In addition, if the law is not passed by a two-thirds majority in each of the Chambers on 
the second vote, the law may be subject to a referendum if requested by either one fifth of the 
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members of either Chamber or 500,000 voters or five Regional Councils. Since the bill failed 
to meet this threshold, and since Renzi himself had, in 2015, announced his intention to call 
for a referendum on the reform to increase its popular legitimacy, a so-called confirmative 
referendum was inevitable. Hence, after the approval of the bill by parliament, MPs from 
both houses, as well as from both the opposition and government, acted swiftly to lodge a 
request with the Supreme Court of Cassation on 20 April 2016, with the ‘Committee for Yes’ 
later surpassing the necessary 500,00 signatures. The referendum was declared as legitimate, 
and the government, on 26 September, decided that the date of the referendum would be 4 
December 2016.The text of the referendum read: 
 
‘Do you approve of the text of the constitutional law concerning “provisions 
for the overcoming of symmetric bicameralism, the reduction in the number of 
MPs, the containment of costs of the functioning of institutions, the 
suppression of the CNEL and the revision of Title V of Part II of the 
Constitution”, approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette, 
no. 88 of 15 April 2016?’ 
 
The Political Context of the Referendum 
There were three key elements that provided the political context to the referendum campaign 
and had a bearing on its nature: electoral reform, Renzi’s future, and broader European and 
international developments. 
 From the outset, Renzi recognized that to improve the functioning of Italian 
institutions it would be insufficient to carry through constitutional reform if it were not to be 
accompanied by an electoral reform which reinforced the majoritarian trajectory of the 
former. Electoral reform was needed in any case following the Constitutional Court’s 
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modification of the 2005 electoral law (the so-called Porcellum) on 4 December 2013 with its 
ruling that the law was, in part, unconstitutional. The Court’s decision had effectively 
returned the electoral law to pure proportionality, following which there had been several 
renewed attempts to achieve electoral reform, none of which had succeeded until Renzi 
became Prime Minister. Renzi, in fact, had been elected leader of the PD four days after the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in 2013, and in his acceptance speech he had committed 
himself to electoral reform to prevent the re-occurrence of governing by ‘grand coalition’ (a 
reference to the Letta and Monti governing experiences). Electoral reform subsequently 
constituted part of the Nazereno Pact with Berlusconi, forged in early January 2014 on Renzi 
becoming Prime Minister, and a new electoral law was passed in May 2015, popularly known 
as the ‘Italicum’. This was a second ballot system based on proportional representation (with 
party lists, the first candidate being selected by the party), but adjusted with a majority bonus, 
and combined with a 3% threshold for representation. This electoral law would clearly help 
make real the majoritarian (and one Chamber) emphasis of the constitutional reform 
proposal, and Renzi therefore presented it as an integral – if formally separate - part of the 
constitutional reform package, and assumed that achievement of the former would help 
approval of the latter in the referendum. 
 However, over time, precisely the reverse began to happen, the electoral reform 
became increasingly seen as a liability, for several reasons. First, the reform did not have an 
easy passage through parliament, taking a year and a half and experiencing fierce opposition, 
even from within the PD’s own ranks. The collapse of the ‘Nazareno Pact’ with Berlusconi in 
January 2015 meant Renzi had to turn the final vote on the bill into a confidence vote on the 
government to ensure its safe passage, which generated lasting opposition to the reform. 
Second, there was concern that the two reforms – electoral and constitutional – together 
would place too much (unchecked) power and control in the hands of the governing majority. 
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Some even suggested that it had the potential to embed authoritarian tendencies in the 
system. In this way, opposition to - and divisions over - the electoral reform, especially inside 
the PD, spilled over into the constitutional reform debate, as the mutually reinforcing effect 
of the two reforms was seen in negative, and not positive, terms. Third, the potential for those 
effects to be realized in unwelcome ways was demonstrated by the changing electoral support 
for the different parties. The PD’s electoral dominance in the 2014 European elections (where 
the party had gained approximately 40% of the vote) had changed, by 2016, into a situation 
of tripolarity, successive opinion polls showing a rough balance of support (about 30%) 
between the PD, the Five Star Movement (M5S), and the three parties of the centre-right 
(Forza Italia, Lega Nord, Fratelli d’Italia). The mayoral elections of June 2016, moreover, 
which saw the M5S win Turin and Rome, were evidence that centre-right voters in the first 
round were willing to support the anti-establishment M5S in the second run-off ballot when 
the only other choice was the centre-left. The risk, therefore, was that an electoral system 
based on two rounds of voting would give the opportunity for all the anti-PD forces to align 
in the second round. Fourth, the electoral reform, despite being approved by parliament as 
law, had to overcome more than one legal challenge to its constitutionality. On the one hand, 
the constitutional reform itself contained a provision that would call on the Constitutional 
Court to make a ruling, within 45 days of the referendum, on the constitutionality of the 
electoral law, on the request of at least a fifth of Deputies or Senators, a request that was a 
virtual certainty. On the other hand, the electoral law was, from February onwards, subject to 
a judicial onslaught by lawyers acting for the M5S and Left, Ecology Liberty (SEL), who 
tabled requests with different courts concerning the putative unconstitutional nature of the 
Italicum. The Constitutional Court decided, in September 2016, that, in line with the 
constitutional reform, it would postpone any constitutional verdict of the electoral law until 
after the referendum had been held, thus giving the impression that, even if the Yes vote 
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prevailed, further changes would be possible.  Finally, everybody was aware that, in the event 
of a No vote, the Italicum would be rendered useless, because it would only be applicable to 
one Chamber in a political system based on symmetric bicameralism (identical powers for 
both Chambers), so electoral reform would be necessary.  
As a result of these factors, by the time the new electoral law came formally into 
effect (1 July 2016) its replacement was already being openly discussed, even by Renzi, who 
saw that the best way of buttressing support for the constitutional reform was by shifting to a 
more flexible position and supporting a possible revision of the Italicum once the referendum 
had taken place. The Chamber of Deputies discussed the matter on 20 September 2016 and 
approved a motion which, in principle, supported a review of the Italicum; and  Renzi 
subsequently signed up to an agreement inside the PD to revise the existing law. Electoral 
reform, then, which had been commenced in 2014 as a means of reinforcing both the 
direction of, and support for, the constitutional reform, appeared, by 2016, more as an 
albatross around its neck, and likely to increase the size of the No vote on 4 December. An 
opinion poll released on 19 September 2016 found that 63% of those surveyed were opposed 
to the introduction of the new electoral law and only 37% in favour.1  
The second element of the political context concerned the future of Renzi as Prime 
Minister, which became an issue in December 2015, when Renzi took a political gamble in 
explicitly staking his political future on the referendum outcome. This had the effect of 
turning the ballot into a form of plebiscite on himself, a move subsequently recognized even 
by himself as a tactical error, for even in a situation where his personal ratings were very 
high, it gave his opponents - and especially the M5S and the Lega - a distinctive purpose in 
this referendum: to mobilize the voters who did not approve of Renzi (and who constituted a 
majority) against the reform not on the basis of the merits of the reform but precisely because 
it presented them with an opportunity to remove him from power. It was also distasteful to 
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the PD minority that a Prime Minister should explicitly link his own government’s political 
fortunes to constitutional matters.2 The situation was exacerbated when Renzi’s personal 
ratings began to fall and when the world witnessed the outcome to the Brexit referendum in 
the UK and the American Presidential election. These putative ‘populist’ outcomes were grist 
to the mill for the anti-Renzi, ‘anti-establishment’ campaigns of the M5S and the Lega.   
The third element of the political context was that the referendum and its possible 
outcome was not just of concern to a national audience, it had become an event with 
international visibility and implications. This was partly because of the way in which Renzi 
had ‘talked up’ the reform in the European Union and in the United States - emphasizing how 
important it was for improved governance in the country, and receiving support in Europe 
and a direct endorsement from President Obama - but also because the referendum followed 
close on the heels of the UK Brexit referendum, whose result had had such a dramatic impact 
on sterling and the markets. A ‘No’ outcome began to conjure up, in the imagination of 
many, a possible similar impact on the Italian economy and on Italy’s credibility abroad.  
 
The Campaign: ‘Yes’ versus ‘No’ 
As with the 2006 referendum, the parties divided broadly along government-opposition lines 
(see Table 1), although there was a minority in the PD (centred around former leaders 
Massimo D’Alema and Pier Luigi Bersani) that was fiercely opposed to the reform. Beyond 
the parties, however, the referendum cut more generally across the left-right spectrum. The 
trade unions were split, the catholic-based Italian Confederation of Italian Workers (CISL) 
being in support of the reform, the left-wing General Confederation of Italian Workers 
(CGIL) being opposed and the Union of Italian Workers (UIL) remaining neutral. 
Confindustria (the organization representing Italian business interests) was in favour of the 
reform, Vincenzo Boccia (its President) calling on entrepreneurs to campaign for a Yes vote: 
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‘To have a stable government able to take important decisions is a benefit for the country. 
Those in favour of a No vote argue that with such a vote nothing changes, and this is 
precisely what the country cannot permit itself to do.’3 The Association of Italian National 
Partisans (ANPI) was vehemently opposed, Renzi seemingly underestimating just how 
important the existing Constitution was to the former Communists, and especially the older 
generation who had fought in, or had been influenced by, the Resistance. The Constitution 
was long regarded as one of their signal achievements, and its (and the left’s) claim of partial 
ownership had always rankled those on the right. The old left regarded the document as 
sacrosanct and Renzi’s reform as destroying it, and Renzi was given a rough ride when he 
was hosted by the ANPI at the Festa de l’Unità in Bologna on 15 September 2016. The 
academic community (and notably constitutional lawyers) played an active role in the 
referendum debate. In April, over 50 jurists (including university professors and magistrates) 
signed a manifesto against the reform, which was more than matched, in May, by 193 
university professors from various disciplines signing a manifesto outlining the reasons for a 
Yes vote. In March Il Fatto Quotidiano began a petition against the reform which attracted 
scores of signatories, while La Repubblica, on 2 June, published a call for a vote in favour 
signed by over 300 people from the academic and related professions.  The press was 
divided, with Il Sole 24 Ore, L’Unita and Il Foglio being in favour of the reform, Il Fatto 
Quotidiano, Il Manifesto, Il Giornale and Libero being opposed, and the three big dailies, 






Table 1: Party Positions on the 2016 Constitutional Referendum (with % of vote in 2013 
national elections, Chamber of Deputies) 
Yes No Undecided / 
Neutral 
Democratic Party (PD)  
(29.43%) 





New Centre Right (NCD) 
(N/A) 
Forza Italia (FI)  
(21.6) (as The People of Liberty) 
 
Liberal Popular Alliance (ALA) 
(N/A) 
Northern League (LN) 
(4.9%) 
 
Civic Choice (SC) 
(8.3%) 
Brothers of Italy (FdI) 
(2.0%) 
 
Italy of Values (IdV) 
(N/A) 
Union of the Centre (UdC) 
(1.8%) 
 
Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 
(N/A) 
Conservatives and Reformists 
(CR)  
 
Democratic Centre (CD) 
(0.5%) 
Greens (Verdi) 
(3.2% - as part of Left, Ecology, 
Liberty) 
 
Act to Stop the Decline! (Fare!)  
(1.1%) 
Italian Left (SI) 
(3.2% - as part of Left, Ecology 
Liberty) 
 
 Possible (Possibile) 
(N/A)_ 
 




Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior 
 As with previous referenda, the campaign became oriented around Committees for 
Yes and No. For the ‘Yes’ campaign, Renzi appointed the American Jim Messina (and his 
colleague David Hunter), who had led Barack Obama’s re-election campaign in 2012 and had 
acted as consultant in David Cameron’s re-election campaign in 2015. The ‘Committee Just a 
Yes’ was launched on 21 May 2016 under the strapline ‘Just a Yes’ (Basta un sí).  On the 
‘No’ side, the largest ‘Committee for No’ was the first one set up in October 2015 by 
Alessandro Pace and Gustavo Zagrebelsky (Comitato per il No nel referendum sulle 
modifiche alla Costituzione). There were a number of other committees on both sides of the 
referendum, but the above two tended to lead the campaigns. 
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It is difficult to identify precisely when the campaigns commenced because, long 
before a referendum (and certainly its date) had been decided upon, the supporters and 
opponents of the reform began positioning themselves and attempting to frame the debate 
(Diamanti 2016). Consequently, the debate that took place over the constitutional reform 
during its legislative journey largely rolled straight into the debate over the forthcoming 
referendum. For Renzi, therefore, the arguments with which he had commenced the 
constitutional reform were articulated throughout the referendum campaign: that this was an 
essential element of his broader programme aimed at scrapping the old political class and 
radically reforming its principal institution, parliament (public confidence in both of which 
had sunk to historic low levels), and thereby creating a new politics in Italy (rottamazione). 
The constitutional reform was presented primarily as being concerned - alongside electoral 
reform – with streamlining and simplifying the political process, increasing the capacity of 
Italian governments to pass legislation, and reducing the costs of politics - especially relevant 
and timely in view of the corruption scandals engulfing the political class at the regional 
levels.  
This linking up of the reform with Renzi’s broader political programme may have 
been advantageous earlier on, but during 2016 it became clear that it was not working. By the 
Spring, Renzi’s team were confronted with polling evidence that showed that the long-term 
predominance (albeit with some volatility) of the ‘Yes’ support, stretching back to the 
legislative approval of the reform in 2014/15, had ebbed away, and the decline continued into 
the Autumn, with the ‘No’ vote being in the majority by the last two months of the campaign, 
albeit in a context of a still substantial number of undecided voters (as high as 30% in 
September), thus leaving the reform on a knife-edge (see Figures 1 & 2).   
The Yes campaign therefore focused first and foremost on the undecideds. This group 
was divided roughly in half, between those voters declaring that they intended to vote but had 
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not made up their minds (and who therefore needed convincing of the merits of the reform), 
and those who had not yet decided whether to vote (or did not indicate their preference). 
Regarding the latter, furthermore, polls suggested that the potential vote was in the ‘Yes’ 
campaign’s favour. A poll held in July found that a small projected ‘Yes’ majority of 3% 
based on only those who declared themselves certain to vote increased to 7% when all those 
interviewed were included.4  This suggested that the bigger the turnout the more votes would 
likely be cast for ‘Yes’, and so (even though there was no quorum for confirmative referenda) 
the campaign was focused also on simply getting the vote out. 
 
 
Note: This is a monthly average ‘poll of polls’, calculated by the author on the basis of a total of 116 polls (Jan: 
9; Feb: 4; March: 2; April: 7; May: 11; June: 9; July: 13; Aug: 4; Sept: 15; Oct: 21; Nov: 21). The final poll 

















Note: This is a monthly average ‘poll of polls’, calculated by the author on the basis of a total of 116 polls (Jan: 
9; Feb: 4; March: 2; April: 7; May: 11; June: 9; July: 13; Aug: 4; Sept: 15; Oct: 21; Nov: 21). The final poll 
(before the required ‘blackout’) was held on 17 November. 
Source: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_constitutional_referendum,_2016;   
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sondaggi_sul_referendum_costituzionale_del_2016_in_Italia 
 
The Yes campaign also focused on attracting voters from beyond the PD to support 
the reform. Polling suggested that, despite the divisions in the PD leadership, PD voters were 
as compact as the M5S and the Lega, with 81% projected to vote for the reform and 19% 
against, in contrast with 19% and 81% for the M5S and 21% and 79% for the Lega. 
However, voters for Forza Italia (40% Yes / 60% No) and the centre lists (59% Yes, 40% No) 
were more fragmented, so the hunt was on for votes from these quarters.5 Attention was 
particularly focused on supporters of Forza Italia on the grounds that Berlusconi had, in 
parliament, voted for the reform, but then shifted position solely as a consequence of the 
election of Sergio Mattarella as President of the Republic. Renzi declared – to the 










Figure 2. Yes/No Voting Intentions (2016) in Constitutional 
Referendum (%, adjusted without undecided)
Yes No 0
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referendum it was necessary to appeal to the right.6 At the same time, the PD minority was 
not completely ignored, and Bersani’s own votes in parliament for the reform were 
emphasized to expose similar contradictions and instrumentality at the heart of the minority’s 
position, i.e. that it was opposition to Renzi and not to the reform that lay at its heart. 
Emphasis was also placed on the long, two-year parliamentary process and 122 amendments 
the reform had undergone, to demonstrate its legitimacy since the opposition was arguing that 
this was a personal reform of Renzi’s rammed through parliament on the strength of its 
majority.7  
 To be successful in targeting these constituencies required an operation to 
depersonalize the campaign, focusing on the substantive merits of the reform, especially as 
poll findings suggested that this was potentially fruitful ground. Of the main points of the 
reform (reduction of senators from 315 to 100, end of symmetric bicameralism, suppression 
of the CNEL, reduction of quorum for referenda, increased competences to the State, 
abolition of the provinces), there was a majority in support of each of them, producing an 
overall average of 48% in favour of the reform. However, when presented with the same 
question but about the package of reforms overall, the approval ratings were suppressed by 
6%, suggesting that personalization was getting in the way of approval. At the same time, 
despite the reform being very well known in the corridors of power and amongst the 
intellectual community, polling revealed the large degree of ignorance about the reform, 
which was perhaps indicative of the lack of public engagement with the referendum until the 
campaign’s final weeks. Despite the coverage of the issue in the press and television (albeit 
much of this focused on the divisions between and inside the parties), only 10% of people 
surveyed said they knew about the reform in detail, 44% knew the broad lines of the reform, 
while 38% had ‘heard the reform spoken about’ and 8% were not even aware of its existence.  
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Yet, despite a concerted attempt to convince voters that ‘this is not a referendum on 
Renzi’,8 with Renzi begging Italians to vote on the basis of the merits of the reform and not 
on him, saying ‘there’ll be plenty of other occasions to send me home,’9 it proved difficult to 
put the genie back in the bottle. The parties of opposition had their mantra, and even Renzi 
himself – knowing he would in fact resign if defeated – could hardly press the argument too 
far that this reform had nothing to do with the survival of his government. In any case, he 
himself could not resist championing the political aspects of the vote beyond the merits of the 
reform itself. There would not be, he warned, another occasion like this in thirty years and ‘if 
we lose, beyond the PD there is no proletarian revolution, but the right [wing politics] of 
Salvini and Grillo’.10 And, in maybe an unguarded moment, he said to the party faithful that 
if he lost he would ‘change profession.’11 Finally, Renzi was probably the best apologist for 
the reform, and therefore had to be used to the maximum. Hence, the high-profile campaign 
debates he engaged in on national television, first with Gustavo Zagrebelsky and then with 
Ciriaco De Mita (whereas both Berlusconi and Grillo refused to debate him). In a poll carried 
out in July, 53% of those interviewed indicated that they would be voting on the basis of a 
judgement on the Renzi government, and by 15 November, this figure had risen to 56% 
(www.sondaggipoliticoelettorale.it), suggesting that no depersonalization of the referendum 
had occurred. 
The party political nature of the referendum campaign may have been inevitable and 
it may also have been a consequence of the No campaign, or that part of it aligned with the 
Five Star Movement and the Lega, which largely ignored the substantive merits of the reform 
itself  and appealed to voters to reject it simply to remove Renzi. For them the reform was of 
interest only because of its dubious constitutional legality (which they challenged 
unsuccessfully in the courts) and the supposedly illegitimate parliament that passed it 
(because the Supreme Court had ruled the electoral law through which the parliament had 
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been elected as unconstitutional). Yet, it would be wrong to reduce the No campaign to this, 
especially as Berlusconi did not sit in this camp (indeed, he was largely invisible in the 
campaign, fearful of being identified too closely with Matteo Savini’s Lega) and nor did 
Bersani, both arguing that Renzi should stay on if defeated. More generally, with the issue 
cutting across the opposition parties and the PD, the overall message was fragmented 
(naturally the PD minority did not wish to see itself as aligned with the right-wing populists).  
The vitriolic nature of some of the debate inside the PD suggested that the PD 
minority’s differences with Renzi went beyond the constitutional reform itself, and that the 
goal of some party members was to secure a ‘No’ victory and a subsequent seizing back of 
control at the party congress.12 Even an attempt by Gianni Cuperlo  to forge some kind of 
agreement around a possible reform of the Italicum (to make it more likely that the PD 
minority might vote for the constitutional reform) was rejected by Bersani. Yet, at the same 
time, there was also genuine concern in the PD voiced about substantive aspects of the 
reform, and notably: its majoritarian nature which, when reinforced by the Italicum, was 
regarded as too extreme, creating a Prime Minister, government and single Chamber with 
almost unchecked powers, especially worrying in view of the electoral strength of the M5S; 
the reduction of the Senate to a body which failed to represent either voters or sub-national 
governments; and the degree of centralization of the reform, which undermined the centre-
left’s own devolutionary changes of 2001. 
Overall, however, the two campaigns were characterized more by straplines than 
engagement in substantive debate, and by a polarization of debate around broadly party 
political positions, which the existence of the PD minority did little to offset. Those intending 
to vote ‘No’ were repeatedly branded as voters who were against any change and were 
irresponsible in wanting to bring down the government and destabilize the country, while 
those intending to vote ‘Yes’ were identified as Renzi acolytes who, for the sake of securing 
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their own power base in the short term, were willing to undermine Italian democracy, 
locating too much power in the government and Prime Minister. True, at the intellectual 
level, there was a more profound debate – especially amongst constitutional lawyers and 
political scientists – on the merits and demerits of the reform.13 Yet, while this was 
characterized by much passion, it also – like the Brexit referendum debate it followed – 
indulged in a good deal of questionable assumptions about the effects of the proposed reform. 
Genuine scientific debate was constrained by the fact that the referendum demanded a single 
vote on a package of different measures, compelling most contributors to side entirely with 
either Yes or No.14 In any case, it is not clear what effect – clarifying, convincing or simply 
confusing – this passionate intellectual debate had on the wider public, assuming people even 
followed it.  
 
The Results 
The referendum result was a resounding rejection of the proposed constitutional reform, with 
59.1% (just under 19 and a half million voters) voting against and 40.9% (just under 13 and a 
half million voters) voting for, on a turnout of 65.5% (68.5% if one excludes Italian voters 
abroad).15  
The high turnout was an indication of just how important this referendum had become 
for the voting public, whatever its level of ignorance about the substantive issues and 
whatever motivation behind its voting. Indeed, compared with the two previous constitutional 
referenda, this was a real high water mark in participation: in 2006 it was 53.8% and in 2001 
a mere 34.0%. The turnout was also higher than in the previous two European elections 
(2014: 58.7%; 2009: 66.5%). However, there was a regional dimension to the turnout, with 
the northern and central regions registering much higher turnouts than the south and the 
islands. This was reflected, without exception, in the turnout by region, where the largest 
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turnout was Veneto (76.66%) and the lowest Calabria (54.43%) (see Table 1).  It was also 
reflected at the level of the provinces - where turnout ranged from 47.7% to 78.9% - with all 
central and northern provinces exceeding the national average and all southern provinces 
being below it. Furthermore, the patterns of turnout in the referendum reveal very distinct 
similarities with the previous national elections of 2013 rather than previous referenda, 
suggesting that the clear polarization, partisan politicization and personalization of the 
campaign was carried through into the vote itself (Pritoni 2016). 
 
Table 2: The Constitutional Referendum 2016: Turnout and Results by Area/Region 
Area/Region Turnout (%) Yes (%) No (%) 
North West: 72.04 42.80 57.20 
Piedmont 72.30 43.52 56.48 
Valle d’Aosta 71.90 43.25 56.75 
Lombardy 74.22 44.51 55.49 
Liguria 69.73 39.92 60.08 
North East: 73.80 43.65 56.35 
Trentino Alto Adige 72.23 53.87 46.13 
Veneto 76.66 38.04 61.96 
Friuli Ven Giulia 72.51 39.03 60.97 
Red Belt: 74.17 49.17 50.83 
Emilia-Romagna 75.93 50.39 49.61 
Tuscany 74.45 52.51 47.49 
Marche 72.84 44.93 55.07 
Umbria 73.47 48.83 51.17 
Centre: 66.77 33.36 66.64 
Lazio 69.16 36.68 63.32 
Abruzzo 68.71 35.61 64.39 
Sardinia 62.45 27.78 72.22 
South: 59.74 33.17 66.83 
Molise 63.92 39.22 60.78 
Campania 58.88 31.48 68.52 
Puglia 61.71 32.84 67.16 
Basilicata 62.85 34.11 65.89 
Calabria 54.43 32.96 67.04 
Sicily 56.65 28.40 71.60 
Italy 68.48 40.04 59.96 
Overseas 30.75 64.70 35.30 
Total 65.47 40.88 59.12 
 
Source: Minister of the Interior, and author’s own calculations. 
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 There was also a clear regional dimension to the voting patterns for Yes and No, even 
though the decisiveness of the No vote was not in doubt. All the broad areas of the country 
(North-West, North-East, Red Belt, Centre and South) voted against the reform, albeit with 
different margins, the Centre and South of the country rejecting the reform by large margins. 
Yet, all were decisive apart from the Red Belt where the percentage difference was marginal. 
At the regional level, only three regions - Trentino Alto Adige, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany 
– voted for the reform, while the islands and some southern regions recorded very high 
majorities against the reform: Sardinia, Sicily, Campania, Puglia and Calabria (see Table 2). 
At the provincial level, only 12 provinces in the whole of the country voted in favour of the 
reform. Eleven of these were in central Italy (Firenze, Siena, Pisa, Arezzo, Pistoia, Prato, 
Forlì-Cesena, Ravenna, Bologna, Modena and Reggio Emilia) and one was in the far north 
(Bolzano/Bozen). And in keeping with the regional divide, the larger the majorities were in 
the south, with some provinces registering votes of over 70% against the reform. 
 If the regional analysis suggests a socio-economic dimension to the voting patterns 
(the more peripheral or marginalized areas of the country voting No), this tends to be 
confirmed in an analysis of the big cities, where the Yes vote did decidedly better than the 
smaller urban centres, with a clear contrast between the central zones and the more peripheral 
localities. In Milan (where the Yes vote prevailed), Rome and Turin (where, in both, the No 
vote prevailed), the central areas voted for the reforms and the peripheries against 
(D’Alimonte and Emanuele 2016; Borghese 2016). The No vote was especially large in those 
provinces where the youth unemployment rates were high (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 
forthcoming), although this pattern was more discernible and consistent in the south than in 
the north of the country, which experienced greater variation (Regalia and Tronconi, 
forthcoming). 
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There was also a partisan dimension to the voting, which is revealed by a comparison 
of the vote with the 2013 national elections.16 A straightforward addition of the electoral 
strengths in the 2013 national election of those parties which opposed the Constitutional 
reform in 2016 (the M5S, the parties of the centre right and the parties to the left of the PD), 
and adjusting for party organizational change, produces a total percentage (59.7%) which 
aligns almost precisely with the percentage that voted No in the referendum. At the same 
time, there were distinct regional variations in this pattern, with the political alignment being 
closer in the north than in the south. The No vote in 2016 surpassed its 2013 levels in almost 
all the southern regions, the islands and large parts of the North East, while in the Red 
Regions it only marginally below its 2013 outcome (Tronconi, 2016; Regalia and Tronconi 
forthcoming; and see Cavallaro 2016).17 
If this suggests that Renzi’s attempt to convince supporters of the opposition parties to 
vote Yes failed, it is confirmed in comparing the changes in vote for individual parties in 
2013 with their votes in the 2016 referendum. Based on an analysis of eleven cities, Vignati 
(2016) found that there was a high turnout amongst the voters (as registered in 2013) of the 
M5S, the vast majority of whom voted against the Constitutional reform (with the proportion 
in more than half of the cities in excess of 90%). The compactness of the M5S vote was 
surpassed by the (albeit small number of) voters for the centrist parties (the Monti coalition) 
in 2013, who voted almost unanimously for Yes (save for a few exceptions in the South). In 
complete contrast, the PD’s voters from 2013 – while having the highest turnout of the 
parties in 2016 – divided over the referendum, an evident effect of the split in the leadership 
over the reform. The proportion of dissenters ranged from 20.3% in Florence to as high as 
33% in Turin (in the North) and 45.9% in Cagliari (in the South), figures that were 
exacerbated by the addition of abstainers (and notably in Reggio Calabria at 29.4%, 
combined with 12.0% voting No). And similarly, those who in 2013 voted for the Popolo 
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della Libertà (PDL) were divided in the 2016 referendum, probably the effect of Berlusconi’s 
change of position and subsequent low-key, ambivalent approach in the campaign, with 
relatively high minorities in support of the reform in some cities (Florence 44%, Bologna 
41%).  
Finally, there was an age demographic in the voting patterns, with younger voters 
voting more decisively to reject the reform than older voters: 81% of 18-34 year olds and 
67% of 35-54 year olds voted No, while only those over 55 registered a small majority (53% 
in total) in favour of the reform (Pasquino and Valbruzzi forthcoming). 
In summary, and from hindsight, this was an election that Renzi was never likely to 
win. Voters appear to have interpreted the referendum primarily from the perspective of a 
normal election rather than a consultation on a specific reform, meaning it was essentially a 
political vote. This explains both the very high turnout and the partisan identification of much 
of the voting, especially in the north. However, the strength of partisanship between the 
different parties varied, the main opposition (M5S) having a granite-type compactness, in 
contrast with the PD which Renzi failed to hold together for the vote. There was, in other 
words, more to the political nature of the vote than simple partisanship (as measured against 
the previous national election). The vote was also political in the sense of embodying a 
judgement on Renzi’s government and its record. A post-referendum poll by Demopolis 
revealed a further increase (on the pre-referendum polls) of the percentage of people having 
voted on the basis of a judgement on the government (67%) rather than on the reform itself 
(33%).18 And this political vote had a distinct socio-economic dimension to it insofar as a 
significant determinant of the rejection appears to have been the dissatisfaction of many 
voters in precarious, marginalised economic situations (especially in the South and amongst 
younger voters). In that sense, the message coming from the M5S and the Lega seems to have 
got through: ‘this referendum can be compared with the Brexit referendum and Trump 
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election, two cases in which the impact of the centre-periphery dimension and the influence 
of marginalized voters can be seen’ (D’Alimonte and Emanuele 2016). Renzi himself, of 
course, originally introduced the idea that the referendum should be a plebiscite on himself 
(and judgement on his government), and that is ultimately what he appears to have got, 
except not with the outcome he wanted: the vote can be interpreted as a clear signal of 
dissatisfaction with the Renzi government, if not an outright rejection of it. It was also a vote 
that witnessed a split in the country, with different voting patterns in the North (where 
political partisanship prevailed) to the South (where the economic situation prevailed) 
(Regalia and Tronconi forthcoming: 111). 
 
The Impact 
The impact of the referendum was almost immediate, Renzi resigning three days later, on 7 
December, thus keeping his promise (as he reminded Italians) and implying that he accepted 
the vote as a verdict on his government. President Mattarella moved fast, knowing that 
calling fresh elections was not an option open to him, because the rejection of the 
Constitutional reform left Italy with two different electoral systems for two chambers which 
had identical powers, making possible two different majorities and subsequent legislative 
gridlock. Elections could, practically, only take place following further electoral reform to 
harmonise the two existing electoral laws. Mattarella therefore engaged in a series of 
consultations over two days with delegations from all 26 political parties/groupings. 
Inevitably, the PD played the most important role in this process by identifying the politician 
most likely to secure the party’s overall support. Once a clear consensus emerged, Mattarella 
gave Paolo Gentiloni a mandate to form a government. Gentiloni moved similarly quickly to 
choose his Ministers, who were sworn in on 9 December, the government then securing the 
confidence of both chambers on 13-14 December. 
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  By Italian standards, this was a remarkably swift and smooth transition between 
governments (Gentiloni even breaking the record for the shortest ever confidence speech to 
parliament, at only 17 minutes long). Whether due to this or more generally because the 
markets had pre-adjusted in anticipation of a No vote, the feared economic ‘shock’ did not 
happen. Apart from a temporary fall in the value of the Euro, the markets seemed prepared to 
give Italian politicians the time to remove the uncertainty pertaining to its lack of 
government, which they did without difficulty and fuss. However, it would be unrealistic to 
paint this exercise in purely positive terms. On the contrary, it is coloured by a strong dose of 
irony and déja-vu. For if, as this chapter has argued, the referendum was above all a 
(negative) political judgement on Renzi and his government then what was installed 
following that verdict was, in many ways, little more than a paler version of the Renzi 
government itself – but without the constitutional reform. 
 The new Prime Minister was no outsider, for he had held one of the key ministries 
(Foreign Affairs) in Renzi’s government. Gentiloni, moreover, was a supporter of Renzi since 
backing him in his successful bid for the leadership of the PD in 2013, as well as being a 
long-term supporter of the PD (he had been a member of the founding committee in 2007). 
The composition of his new government did not just smack of continuity with its predecessor, 
it was almost a carbon copy of it. The majority on which it rested was essentially the same as 
that which had supported Renzi’s government: the PD, a marginally changed ‘Popular Area’ 
(made up of the New Centre Right and the Centrists for Italy) and two independents. The 
only real difference was the refusal of Denis Verdini’s ‘Liberal Popular Alliance’ (ALA) to 
join the government (it had been in Renzi’s), but only because Gentiloni, despite requests, did 
not give the party any ministries. With some reshuffling, all but five Ministers were the same 
as before. Perhaps most surprisingly, the former Minister for Relations with Parliament, 
Maria Elena Boschi, who had been responsible for navigating through parliament the 
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Constitutional reform proposal which ultimately wrecked Renzi’s premiership, and who, like 
Renzi, had promised to resign if the reform were rejected, was not just kept on but promoted 
to Under Secretary to the Prime Minister. The goals of the government were no different to 
those which the Renzi government had been prioritizing just before the vote: electoral 
reform, sorting out the crisis in the Italian banking sector, applying relief measures to the 
Italian earthquake zone, and securing agreement with the unions on a new public workers’ 
contract. Gentiloni, in his confidence speech, explicity lauded the Renzi government and its 
achievements and claimed continuity with it. Renzi, meanwhile, remained leader of the PD 
and quickly made it clear that, far from retiring from politics, he wished to lead the party into 
the next election campaign with a view to winning and then continuing with his programme 
of reform. 
 In short, while, from one perspective, the new Gentiloni government was seen as 
providing institutional stability in a time of crisis, from another it was viewed as amounting 
to the establishment’s resistance to - or denial of - the popular rejection of Renzi, and giving 
the latter and his troops the time to re-group. For the M5S and the Lega, it was as if the Yes 
vote had prevailed, and they derided the appointment of the new Prime Minister as a cynical 
manouevre to prevent them from coming to power. It was also, they believed, symptomatic of 
the deep crisis Italian democracy was undergoing: Gentiloni was the fourth Prime Minister in 
a row (after Gianni Letta, Mario Monti and Renzi) who had been appointed to the Prime 
Minister’s office in the absence of an electoral victory. The last time that happened was as 
long ago as 8 May 2008 when Berlusconi was appointed Prime Minister after a sweeping 
electoral victory. 
 It was not surprising, therefore, that the new government had a large dose of 
opprobrium poured on it, most vividly expressed in the opposition parties taking the 
unprecedented measure of boycotting the parliamentary confidence debate. Expressing their 
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opinions via the piazza and the internet, they left Gentiloni speaking to a half-empty 
chamber. On his blog, Beppe Grillo, in an evident reference to the referendum result, 
declared that, ‘This government has received a vote of no confidence from 20 million 
Italians.’ 
Whichever interpretation was accurate, what was clear at the end of 2016 was that the 
Gentiloni government was not seen as anything more than either providing stability during a 
crisis or an establishment denial of a popular verdict on Renzi. Although not made explicit, it 
was clear from the views expressed by politicians and party spokespersons that the new 
government had a shelf-life dictated by the delivery of electoral reform (once the 
Constitutional Court had released its judgement on the Italicum, due on 24 January 2017); 
once achieved, the pressure on Gentiloni to resign to allow fresh elections would likely be 
difficult to resist. 
Finally, the question arises as to the impact of the referendum result on institutional 
reform and its future prospects. When the Italian people last rejected a major constitutional 
reform, ten years before, the outcome was regarded by this author as the ‘end of the “great 
reform” but not of reform itself’ (Bull 2007), the ‘great reform’ involving a wide-ranging, 
comprehensive constitutional reform passed as a single package. Ten years on, it is evident 
that the pursuit of the ‘great reform’ had not, in fact, ended, or at least not in the eyes of the 
political class. Aside of the differences between Berlusconi’s and Renzi’s reform proposals 
and how they came about (Renzi’s, after all, originated in President Napolitano’s initiation of 
a process in 2013 which Renzi then inherited), there is little doubt that they were both 
attempts within the ‘great reform’ tradition. The difference to other failed ‘great reform’ 
attempts (e.g. the Bicamerale, Bozzi) is that they attempted to pass the reform on the back of 
parliamentary majorities - rather than via a type of ‘Constituent Assembly’ - the sizes of 
which were not large enough to prevent recourse to the popular will (which Renzi had wanted 
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in any case). They both consequently came to grief in the ballot box, and for reasons largely 
beyond the merits of the reforms themselves. The consequences, however, were much greater 
for Renzi than for Berlusconi (who had already lost office before the 2006 referendum had 
been held) and they are consequences that leave the future of institutional reform in doubt. 
Renzi had come to office on an anti-establishment platform (albeit from the centre left), 
promising to sweep away the old politicians and introduce a new politics to Italy. An 
essential element of that strategy was the overhaul of key institutional structures and political 
procedures that were acting as an obstacle to achievement of other pressing reforms. Renzi 
therefore placed his personal stamp on the constitutional reform, linking it inexplicably to 
this anti-establishment strategy. Yet, in the nearly three years it took from conception of the 
reform to referendum, Italian party politics changed and the reform became increasingly 
identified (or presented by opponents) in opposite terms: as part of an attempt by Renzi (as 
part of the establishment) to hold on to power in the face of anti-establishment forces (on the 
right) which were ready to seize power. In short, while the referendum undoubtedly 
amounted to a rejection and removal of Renzi, it would be wrong to assume that it had no 
consequences at all for the reform itself. The manner and decisiveness of the rejection leaves 
politicians in a quandary, for it is difficult to envisage in the future any Italian parties or 
politicians having the courage to take on a reform of that scale when the parameters of 
interpretation of the reform and its protagonists are subject to the loss of control that Renzi 
experienced. With fundamental institutional reform having now been sunk by two 
referendums in the space of a decade, it is possible that this last attempt will go down in 
history for finally exhausting – after forty years – the ‘long quest in vain’ (Bull and Pasquino 
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